

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 09378

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USSALTTWO

E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DRAFTING GROUP MEETING NO. 224, JUNE 19, 1978
(SALT TWO - 1788)

REFS: A. SALT TWO-1783 B. SALT TWO - 1761

SUMMARY. SOVIETS QUESTIONED US PROPOSED DEFINITION OF
CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON DISTINCTION
BETWEEN ANTI-SHIP AND OTHER MISSILES, RELATIONSHIP OF
DELTA CONCEPT TO THAT OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE,
AND SIZE OF FUEL RESERVE. US REPLIED IN DETAIL. US ALSO
RETURNED TO SUBJECT OF ASSURED INOPERABILITY BUT SOVIETS
ASKED TO DEFER DISCUSSION UNTIL LATER MEETING. END
SUMMARY.

1. KARPOV POSED SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT US PROPOSED
CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION, KEYED TO AMBASSADOR
EARLE'S JUNE 14 PLENARY STATEMENT (REF A). HE NOTED THAT
SOME PORTIONS OF THAT STATEMENT SEEMED CLOSE TO SOVIET-
PROPOSED PROVISIONS; FOR EXAMPLE, MEASURING ALONG PROJEC-
TION OF MISSILE'S FLIGHT PATH ONTO EARTH'S SPHERE. HOW-
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EVER, SOVIETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR INTRODUCING
DISTINCTIONS BASED ON TYPE OF TARGET INTO DEFINITION.
PEREZ POINTED OUT THAT US WAS NOT TRYING TO CHANGE AGREED
RANGE LIMITATIONS BUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANTI-SHIP CMS
AND OTHER TYPES OF CMS COULD BE DRAWN BECAUSE ANTI-SHIP
MISSILES HAVE DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. IN
THEIR CASE, CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE

ALONE WOULD APPLY. CLEARLY ANTI-SHIP CMS WERE NOT STRATEGIC WEAPONS AS THEIR MISSIONS WERE TACTICAL IN NATURE. GRAHAM NOTED THAT US HAD NOT CHANGED DEFINITION FOR THE RANGE OF ALL CMS, WHICH IS BASED ON MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE (MSOR), BUT HAD ADDED AN ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINT FOR THOSE CMS WHICH ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR ANTI-SHIP ROLE.

2. KARPOV ASKED WHAT DIFFERENCE THERE WAS BETWEEN ANTI-SHIP CM AND OTHERS. GRAHAM REPLIED THAT DIFFERENCE WAS IN MANNER BY WHICH CM SEARCHED OUT AND ENGAGED A TARGET AT SEA, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF LANDMARKS. KARPOV SAID IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MISSILES WITH RANGES ABOVE AND BELOW 600 KILOMETERS AND ASKED WHAT LAUNCHERS WERE ENVISAGED FOR ANTI-SHIP MISSILES. SCHNEITER NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO DISTINCTION MADE WITH REGARD TO LAUNCH PLATFORMS. DISTINCTION MADE WAS ON BASIS OF MISSILE'S MISSION, WHICH DETERMINED ITS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS. KARPOV STRESSED, IN RESPONSE, NEED FOR UNSWERVING OBSERVANCE OF AGREED LIMITATIONS SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO POSSIBILITY OF MISREPRESENTATION OR CIRCUMVENTION. KARPOV ALSO ASKED, RHETORICALLY, IF 600 KILOMETER CMS ARE LAUNCHED FROM LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS HOW CAN OTHER SIDE DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ANTI-SHIP CMS.

3. KARPOV QUERIED SECOND PARAGRAPH OF PLENARY STATEMENT'S SECRET

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SECTION III, ASKING WHAT THE CORRELATION WAS BETWEEN CASES IN WHICH MISSILE RANGE WOULD BE MSOR AND THOSE IN WHICH CALCULATION WOULD BE BASED ON COVERING DISTANCE GREATER THAN AGREED PERCENTAGE IN EXCESS OF RANGE LIMITATION. SCHNEITER EXPLAINED THAT BOTH CRITERIA WOULD APPLY. US DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE IS ITS MSOR. IF ITS MSOR IS GREATER THAN RANGE LIMITATION OR IF IT CAN COVER A DISTANCE GREATER THAN A CERTAIN AGREED PERCENTAGE OF THAT LIMITATION WHEN OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE EXCLUSIVE OF FUEL RESERVE IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE A RANGE GREATER THAN SUCH LIMITATION. TO BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING RANGE LESS THAN LIMITATIONS, MISSILE WOULD NEED TO SATISFY BOTH OF BOTH CRITERIA.

4. KARPOV ASKED WHERE THE PERCENTAGE FIGURE CAME FROM AND TO WHAT DISTANCE IT WOULD BE ADDED. SCHNEITER REPLIED THAT FIGURE WOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES AND WOULD BE ADDED TO PERTINENT RANGE LIMITATIONS. KARPOV ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF PERCENTAGE WERE 100. AGREED LIMITATION OF 600 KILOMETERS WOULD THEN TURN INTO 1200 KILOMETERS. SCHNEITER EXPLAINED THAT IN SUCH CASE 600 KILOMETER RANGE WOULD REMAIN BUT MISSILE ENGAGING A TARGET

LESS THAN 600 KILOMETERS FROM ITS LAUNCH POINT COULD NOT FLY AN INTEGRATED DISTANCE ALONG ITS FLIGHT PATH OF MORE THAN 1200 KILOMETERS. KARPOV ASKED WHETHER PERCENTAGE WOULD BE SAME FOR ALL CRUISE MISSILES OR IF IT WOULD DEPEND ON RANGE OR OTHER FACTORS. SCHNEITER REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY SIDES.

5. KARPOV ASKED WHAT US HAD IN MIND IN REFERRING TO FUEL RESERVE "TO MEET CONTINGENCIES" IN JUNE 14 PLENARY STATE-

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MENT. SUCH A RESERVE WOULD PERMIT MISSILE TO PROLONG ITS FLIGHT. WHY SHOULD NOT THIS DISTANCE BE COUNTED? SCHNEITER POINTED OUT THAT FUEL RESERVE WOULD NOT BE USED TO LET MISSILE FLY FARTHER BUT THAT MISSILE MIGHT NEED TO USE ADDITIONAL FUEL FOR CONTINGENCIES. KARPOV ASKED HOW FAR RESERVE COULD CARRY MISSILE, 1 KILOMETER OR 1000? WHAT WOULD DETERMINE THIS FUEL RESERVE AND HOW MUCH COULD MISSILE HAVE ON BOARD WHEN IT REACHED RANGE LIMIT? SCHNEITER NOTED THAT REASONABLE FUEL RESERVE WAS CONCEPT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH SIDES. GRAHAM ADDED THAT FUEL RESERVE WOULD NOT EXIST AT END OF FLIGHT IF MISSILE ENCOUNTERED CONTINGENCIES DURING FLIGHT.

6. KARPOV ASKED HOW THIS WOULD BE RESOLVED IN TECHNICAL SENSE. WOULD THERE BE CANISTERS OR TANKS TO BE DISPOSED OF, OR WOULD FUEL BE CUT OFF? WHAT WOULD BE EXPECTED INCREASE IN DISTANCE MISSILE COULD TRAVEL IN NORMAL STRAIGHT FLIGHT? IF MISSILE HAS RANGE OF 600 KILOMETERS, HOW FAR COULD IT FLY ON THIS FUEL RESERVE IN NORMAL CONDITIONS? IN REPLY, US INDICATED THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR NUMBER TO BE CITED, STRESSING CONCEPT OF REASONABLE RE-

SERVE AND DESIRE TO DEVELOP APPROACH RATHER THAN SPECIFICS
AT THIS POINT.

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7. KARPOV QUERIED OTHER ELEMENTS OF US PROPOSAL, REFERRING TO "STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE" AND "MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE." SCHNEITER NOTED THAT NEITHER CONCEPT WAS NEW TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY REFLECT FACT THAT MODERN CRUISE MISSILES NOT DESIGNED TO FLY IN STRAIGHT LINE TO TARGET. US RANGE DEFINITION REFERS TO DISTANCES AT WHICH TARGET CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGED.

8. KARPOV ARGUED THAT CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE CONFUSING BECAUSE IT DID NOT PERMIT CLEAR-CUT DEFINITION OF RANGE AND UNNECESSARY BECAUSE IT DID NOT ADD ANYTHING TO CONCEPT OF RANGE PLUS AGREED PERCENTAGE. SOVIET PROPOSED DEFINITION, IN CONTRAST, FULLY MET REQUIREMENTS FOR CM RANGE DEFINITION AS IT WOULD EXCLUDE UNCLARITY WHICH COULD LEAD TO FRICTION IN FUTURE. IT WAS, VERY IMPORTANTLY, FULLY CONSISTENT WITH AGREED LIMITS ON CM RANGE, WHICH AS INDICATED IN TODAY'S DISCUSSION, NO ONE IS QUESTIONING. PEREZ RESPONDED THAT US HAD MADE IT CLEAR WHY SOVIET DEFINITION NOT ACCEPTABLE. REVISED US PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS THAT EARLIER US VERSION WAS IMPRECISE. IT WOULD PLACE FINITE LIMIT ON MAXIMUM DISTANCE CM COULD COVER, TAKING ACCOUNT OF NEED FOR MODERN CMS TO MANEUVER HORIZONTALLY.

9. PEREZ REVIEWED US PROPOSAL ON ASSURED INOPERABILITY, PRESENTED IN PLENARY ON MAY 24 (REF B). HE NOTED THAT SOVIET DELEGATION HAD CRITICIZED THAT PROPOSAL BUT HAD OFFERED NOTHING IN EXPLANATION OF THAT CRITICISM. US HAD TAKEN A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN SOVIET DIRECTION BY REVISING TIME FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION TO 12 MONTHS BUT SOVIETS HAD NOT MOVED TO ACCOMMODATE OUR CONCERNS. THERE WAS NOTHING IN US PROPOSAL THAT PRECLUDED CONVERSION OF HEAVY BOMBER INTO AN AIRPLANE TO BE USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

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KARPOV REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION AND ASKED TO DEFER CONSIDERATION UNTIL LATER MEETING.

10. NEXT MEETING JUNE 22. EARLE

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